Qadar (Divine Determining)

Second Topic

The question: Why can one not say this?

The answer: Because Qadar determined that his death would occur through that bullet. If you suppose that the shooter had not shot, you are implying that Qadar is not connected to both cause and effect at the same time. In that case, on what would you base that person’s death?

You would then have to assume, like the followers of the Jabriyya, that cause and effect are each separately determined by Qadar, or else, like the followers of the Mutazila, deny Qadar and join the misguided sects by rejecting the doctrine of Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaah.

Therefore, we, the followers of truth, say: “If he had not shot, his death would have remained unknown to us.” The followers of the Jabriyya say: “If he had not shot, he would still have died.” The followers of the Mutazila say: “If he had not shot, he would not have died.”

The sixth way: Mayalān, the inclination to do something, which forms the fundamental basis of man’s free will, is regarded in the Māturīdī school as an amr-i itibārī, a conceptual matter, and may be attributed to the servant. The Asharī school, however, regarded mayalān as an existent thing and therefore did not attribute it to the servant, while it did regard control over this inclination as an amr-i itibārī. This means that either the inclination itself, according to the Māturīdī school, or control over it, according to the Asharī school, is an amr-i itibārī and not an externally existent thing.

As for an amr-i itibārī, it does not require an illa-i tāmma for its existence. If an illa-i tāmma exists, the effect necessarily follows. This means that no room remains for free will, because the effect then occurs necessarily and inevitably.

If most of the conditions of the illa-i tāmma for an amr-i itibārī appear, this amr-i itibārī may exert influence. For example, when the Qur’an says to man at that moment, “This is evil; do not do it,” man can choose to refrain from it.

Indeed, if the servant were the creator of his own actions and had the power to create, his free will would cease to exist. For according to the principle

مَالَمْ يَجِبْ لَمْ يُوجَدْ

within Ilm al-Usūl wal-Hikmah, something does not come into existence unless its existence becomes necessary. Thus, something can exist only when an illa-i tāmma is present. As for the illa-i tāmma, it necessarily requires the existence of the effect, leaving no room for free will.

The claim, “A preference without a reason for that preference is impossible,” is one of the fundamental principles of the methodology of Ilm al-kalām . However, man’s free will, which we describe as an amr-i itibārī, may choose either to do something or not to do it. If there is no reason for that preference, man’s free will may still prefer one option over the other, even though there is no difference between the two. Yet this claim appears to contradict that fundamental principle of the methodology of ilm al-kalām.

The answer: A preference without one who prefers is impossible. Without a cause that brings about preference, there can be no preference. However, a preference without a compelling reason for that preference is possible and does in fact occur. For will is an attribute, and the nature of this attribute is to make a choice, even without absolute necessity.